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ABSTRACT
Two topics of much debate in the United States, immigration and drug prohibition, are
issues that all countries must scrutinize. I have taken two Euro areas, Scandinavia and
Portugal, and have attempted to use them as templates for the United States so to draw
potential policy implications. Scandinavian countries can be characterized as having pull
factors in the form of welfare policies, which draw immigrants to those countries. It is
hard to deduce whether this has a negative effect on the country because immigrants, not
only use services, but are also consumers. This creates a problem as we try to compare
those countries to the United States, because the U.S. is not a welfare state. We find that
in order to control the situation acceptance of trade-offs are necessary. Furthermore, I
use Portugal as a model for how the United States should conduct its drug policy. As we
know, drug prohibition fosters cartelization, violent and nonviolent crime, spread of
disease, and overdosing. Portugal has fundamentally reduced those harms by
decriminalization. Here, we find that the United States must also consider a set of tradeoffs.
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1. Introduction
When reflecting on the current presidential regime, many believe that the United
States is being transformed into a socialist state. Much of this discussion stems from a
wide range of constituents, and is attributed to the implied direction that President Barack
Obama’s policies would appear, as some would say, to be moving. Indeed, a type of
nationalized healthcare reform seems to support that notion, but the thought of a
nationalized healthcare system alone should not define a nation as socialist. It may be
best to characterize the direction that the United States could potentially be moving as a
European type welfare state. By definition, socialism is a theory of social organization
advocating ownership, or regulation of, production, distribution, and exchange, by the
community as a whole. With having such a broad definition at hand, there are only few
countries that would fit such a description, i.e. People’s Republic of China, Cuba, Laos,
North Korea, and Vietnam. Given this precise definition, any scholar would be hard
pressed to agree that the United States is evolving into a socialist state. The potential
direction, if any, that the United States would appear to be on the coattails of is
something similar to that of the European style welfare states. The purpose of this paper
is not to persuade any one party politically, but rather create a hypothetical environment
that may give us insight as to whether social/welfare state policies may be beneficial,
suitable, or even sustainable, for the United States, and under what conditions this may be
possible.
Conventional wisdom tells us that these modern day welfare states are
implemented with the intention to protect some members of the constituency, and to
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garauntee a minimum standard of living, or other safety nets. Welfare states strive to
achieve certain goals such as: inclusion and cohesion of all cohorts, and productivity
growth. The principle purpose of the welfare state is to provide indemnity against
occasional instances of bad luck, to transfer resources over the constituent’s life cycle,
and to fix free market consequences that may result in excess disparity or exclusion. In
general, a welfare state may choose to provide for those who are in need of disability
services, education, health service, and subsidized housing. This type of policy structure
typically incorporates into their system distinct policies to address areas such as
unemployment, nationalized healthcare, and pensions for the aging population.
Many welfare states have found themselves dealing with equity/efficiency tradeoffs. These trade-offs have the potential to usher in negative effects on the economy,
especially to those countries with a low priority on equity, which advances poverty and
inequality. Besides the usual (static and dynamic) efficiency-equity problems, European
welfare states face a number of challenges in modern times: heterogeneity among
constituents, globalization, migration and demographic changes, most notably the aging
population. So should the European welfare state be considered a fundamental right or
merited virtue? Or is it a burden for future competitiveness and development? And how
could the United States economy potentially survive under similar conditions? To
answer these questions I will analyze selected characteristics of two particular European
welfare states, and from there, will interpret how the United States may react if it were to
adopt similar policies. Although there are myriad manifestations of the welfare state, I
focus on two characteristics of the welfare state: immigration and illicit drugs. These two
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issues have come to the forefront, and are oftentimes platforms for which politicians use
as selling points. Consequently, it is my contention that these issues deserve further
analysis.
The first topic to be covered is immigration. Scandinavia has enjoyed a rather
high standard of living as compared to, not only Europe, but to the rest of the world.
With having such a homogenous society, it may stand to reason that changes in the
inflow of immigration carries the potential for a decline in the already high standard of
living. I investigate whether a policy applied in Scandinavian countries would have the
same effect in the United States, and if not, what are the policy implications that the U.S.
should consider? As it turns out, contrasting push-pull factors make comparison for both
the U.S. and Scandinavian countries exceedingly difficult, but at the same time, shed
light on aspects that deserve special consideration in policy debates.
Secondly, in the United States, a great divide has developed between those who
advocate decriminalization of illicit drugs, and those who don’t. Decriminalization refers
to the removal of all criminal laws relating to the operation of the industry. Legalization
differs as it refers to the use of criminal laws to regulate or control the drug industry by
determining the legal conditions under which the drug industry can operate. Many of the
proponents against decriminalization cite the damaging effects of drugs on the mind and
body, increased availability, and increased crime as their motivation for the continued
support of the prohibition of illicit substances in the United States. Some countries have
taken the step to decriminalize illicit drugs. Portugal, for one, has seen astounding
success with their policy in which all drugs were decriminalized. I argue the point that
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the United States should follow in the footsteps of Portugal’s policy initiation. My
contention is that, not only the United States, but also those countries that participate in
the trafficking of illicit drugs via cartels, would benefit greatly from their
decriminalization. My argument follows the pragmatic consideration of the cost and
benefits associated with decriminalization of illicit drugs. Furthermore, I will offer
suggestions as to how to fine-tune policy, which may help to increase efficiency to
systems, such as that of Portugal.
Although my research reaffirms data that many intellectuals have compiled in
previous studies, there is a great portion of the arguments that I provide which accentuate
said scholar’s research, as well as, add additional perspective and original insight. I am
confident that the aforesaid arguments will initiate further discussion among intellectuals,
and amidst those who have a particular stake in the developments that arise from my
research, or any future research that may precipitate concerning these topics.

2. Impact of immigration on the US and the Scandinavian countries
Immigration is a contentious topic on both sides of the Atlantic. Arguably, the
concept of immigration has different connotations in Europe and in the US. When taking
the homogenous populations of the Scandinavian countries, enjoying a high degree of
income equality and growth, views on immigration may diverge even more from those in
the United States. Intuitive hypotheses on this comparison may thus be crudely drawn
from knowledge of the countries’ respective history, societal structures and public
opinion. Focusing on the economic consequences of immigration, these are contested at
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best, and obviously differ within contexts. Does this entail that the characteristics of
American society, economy and policies lead to immigration having a different effect
than what we see in certain European countries? This section adopts a comparative
perspective and considers the effects of immigration in the US and Scandinavia, paying
special attention to labor market and social protection schemes.

Roy-Borjas Model of Self-Selection
In order to gain a better understanding of what may be driving immigration in
both the United States and the Scandinavian countries, a brief explanation of the RoyBorjas Model is warranted and is furthered by Bodvarsson and Van den Berg (2009).
Under the Roy-Borjas framework, an increase in the reward for skill in the host country
will create greater flows of migration and a transformation to the composition of migrants
to the more skilled segment.
Consider two countries: A and B. Both will have identical mean earnings, but
unequal distributions of income, where returns to skill are higher in country A. If returns
to migration are dependent upon one’s skills, the more skilled workers will fare better in
country A. Under this assumption, skilled migrants will move to A, whereas unskilled
migrants will move to country B. The central idea of the Roy-Borjas model simple: the
realtive payoff to skills across countries determines the skill composition of the
immigrant flow.
The underlying intuition that lies within this model illustrates how workers “selfselect” themselves into favorable employment oppurtunities. Suppose that individuals
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currently residing in a “source” nation are performing a cost-benefit analysis to decide if
they should migrate to the U.S. “Skill” is the single factor in wage determination, and the
following equations will help to determine who will move to the U.S. Roy’s model (Roy,
1951) says that workers decide where to migrate too by comparing their potential
earnings at home (e.g., the source country), and in the U.S. (e.g., the host country).
Potential earnings available to a worker with an efficiency of s units is specified by:

w0 = α 0 + δ 0s
wUS = αUS + δUS s
where w 0 is the workers wage earnings in the source nation; wUS is the wage earnings in
the U.S. Additionally, α 0 €
and αUS represent the income levels of those who have zero

€ skill efficiency s. The two slopes, δ s and δ s , represents
€
the dollar return to an
0
US
additional unit€of skill€efficiency in the source nation and the U.S. When δUS s > δ 0 s , the

€ unit €
payoff to the skill efficiency
is greater in the U.S. When δ 0 s > δUS s , the opposite is
€ there
€ are no costs
true, the return to skill is greater in the source nation. If we assume
associated with migration to the U.S., a worker will €
move€to the U.S. whenever American
wages exceed the earnings of the source country (Roy 1951)1 (Borjas 1987).
Figure 1 displays the self-selection of immigrant flow in better detail. If the rate
of return to skills is greater in the host country, the immigrant flow with skills greater
than Q2 will be positively selected into that country as shown in part (a). Under these
circumstances the slope of the host’s dollars-skills line is steeper than that of the source

€

country. This is referred to as the “brain drain,” meaning highly skilled labor will move
1

The model was applied to immigration by Borjas.
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out of the source country in order to earn higher wages in the host country. Alternatively,
negative selection occurs when the rate of return to skills is lower in the host country,
where immigrant flow is negatively selected out of the host nation. In the negative
selection portion of Figure 1 part (b), workers with less than Q1 skills will emigrate
because they can earn a higher wage by moving to the host country.

€ position where many low skilled
Both Sweden and the United States are in the
workers move into the country to earn a higher wage than they could have received back
in the source country. For the United States, much of the unskilled labor comes from
Mexico, whereas in Sweden, migrants flow in from African and Middle Eastern nations.
The Mexicans, African, and Middle Eastern migrants are said to positively select into the
United States and Sweden. In the case of he United States and Mexico, Table 3 shows
that the U.S. has a higher intercept ( α ), as well as a larger slope ( δ ), than that of Mexico.
Under these circumstances it would be beneficial for workers of all skill ranges to

€ have a larger intercept than
€ Alternatively, Sweden would
migrate to the United States.
African nations, but the African nations could potentially have a steeper slope than
Sweden. This relationship shows that low skilled laborers from African Nations would
be drawn by the higher wages in Sweden. In Sweden’s case, much of the skilled labor
would be exported from the country to make higher wages in these African nations.
Changes in income will either increase, or decrease, the migration flow of the host
and source countries. Using the U.S. as an example, Figure 2 part (a) shows that a fall in
income levels decreases the dollar-skills line to α 'US . If the slope of the return to skills of
the U.S. is greater than that of the source country, the skill threshold shifts to the right to

€

7

S' p . Positive selection will still occur for workers who have skill levels greater than S' p .
On the other hand, if the return to skills is greater in the source nation, as seen in Figure 2

€

part (b), the skill threshold slips back to S'n . This will decrease the amount€of migration
to the U.S., and only those with skill levels below S'n will move to that nation.

€
Theoretical background

€

The characteristics of migration flows are defined by both push and pull factors.
However, when focusing on the effects on the receiving country, pull factors play a
crucial role. The volume of immigration and its consequences on the host country
depends on such features as the state of the economy, the structure of the labor market,
immigration policies, and the size of the welfare state and social protection provisions in
the receiving country. Generous welfare states are often referred to as welfare magnets.
This means that the likely net beneficiaries of the welfare state self-select into generous
states, according to the Roy-Borjas model (Nannestad 2007).
An immigrant population can be very heterogeneous on several dimensions. With
regards to labor market integration and social protection, distinctions must be made
between low-skilled immigrants, and highly educated groups. Whether the incoming skill
is complementary or competing with natives must also be taken into account. A further
distinction is between legal and illegal immigration, as the latter mainly affects the
“shadow” or “black” economy. Policy and geography is key in defining the primary types
of immigrants a country attracts, and these characteristics obviously vary between our
selected regions. The primary reason for immigration into the EU states, and by extension
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the Scandinavian countries, is not labor-related but humanitarian (Begg et al 2008: 103105), and the regulations are increasingly strict. The US faces a more diverse immigrant
population, and illegal immigration is more common.
The literature on the subject is diverse. Milton Friedman once stated that free
immigration is incompatible with a welfare state (as quoted in Nannestad 2007 p. 514).
All developed countries have at least some minimum of immigration controls in place in
today’s world, and globalization is increasingly viewed as putting additional exogenous
strains on national social policies.
As for effects of immigration in the economic sphere, current scholars disagree.
They argue on the one hand that immigration is positive for growth, and can contribute in
combating the fiscal effects of aging of the population (Begg et al 2008). On the other
hand it is claimed that effects are largely negative, in the sense of downward wage
pressures and unemployment, affecting in particular the low skilled end of the local labor
market (e.g. Sinn 2005). While these assertions may hold true, the story as a whole is
much more complex. What is not realised in many of these issues is although immigrants
may put pressure on the welfare state, they also act as consumers. These immigrants may
have a depressing effect on wages in some industries (i.e., those in which they
disproportionally work), but would have a positive affect on wages in industries in which
they disproportionately consume (depending on the elasticity of labor supply in that
industry).

Begg et al (2008) state that globalization impacts labor markets

asymmetrically, with wage inequality a result in the US, and unemployment the result of
the same trend in Europe, due to the social policy induced wage floor. Moreover,
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immigrants may be viewed as an overall fiscal burden for natives and thus poses a threat
to the long-term sustainability of the welfare state (Nannestad 2007), the latter
particularly relevant to Scandinavia. All of this implies that the Scandinavian countries
may attract a different kind of immigrant than does the US, although this distinction may
be fading.
The focus of this section will be on two types of economies and societies. On the one
side there is the low-tax, relatively low social protection provision capitalism of the US, and
on the other we have the social democratic Scandinavian countries which have high
employment, high taxes and high social spending. They differ from the rest of Europe by
defying the recent trend of stagnating growth. Furthermore, the Scandinavian countries have,
while remaining highly open and interdependent economies, increasingly raised the bar for
accepting immigrants from outside the EU, and are primarily accepting asylum seekers.
Intuitively, the effects of immigration must differ between the systems, as the economic
structure, policies and composition of the immigrant population vary to such an extent across
the countries. If they are “welfare magnets”, the Scandinavian countries should experience
immigration that may be unfavourable to the economy compared to the US. From this
follows our research questions. Does the extent of the welfare state influence the type of
immigrant a country attracts? How does the nature of the immigrant population affect
economic performance?
Beyond this brief background, the discussion now turns to deeper look at the
relationship between immigration, the economy, and the welfare state (e.g. Roy-Borjas
Model). Two key areas reviewed are the labor market and social protection. The
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following section will address evidence from the US with regards to effects and issues
related to immigration. The third section looks more closely at the same relationships in
the more welfare oriented Scandinavian countries. Lastly, some potential policy
implications are drawn up.

Immigration in the United States
One emotionally debated topic in the United States is immigration. Migrants flow
into the United States from every border legally, yet natives view immigration negatively.
Most recently, Arizona had passed a law that aims to deter illegal aliens from settling in
the state. While similar laws have met resistance across the rest of the country, 70% of
Arizona voters felt it was necessary. The potential economic implications of immigration
is what strikes fear in the heart of many Americans. In reality how justified are those
fears?
There are those constituents that feel immigration into the United States affects
the American economy adversely. These proponents tend to focus on ideas such as wage
depression, “job stealing”, and the negative relationship between services received and
taxes paid.

Others have a more positive outlook. They see immigration as a catalyst

that leads to lower pricing of goods and services, and as a supplement to total
productivity.

Labor market effects

11

The first set of implications pertains the labor market.

The question is, do

illegal/legal immigrants depress wages? Studies have shown with great success that
migrants, generally illegal, tend to earn much less by way of wages than native workers.
In particular, a study from 1995 has shown that “workers in construction, manufacturing,
and other industrial divisions earned substantially less per hour than did all US
production and nonsupervisory workers ($2.66/hour versus $4.47/hour)” (Espenshade,
1995). In addition, it was found that these generally unskilled laborers worked more than
their native counterparts.

It was also established that these illegal migrants make

significantly less than legal migrants. Therefore, it would logically follow that those
legal/illegal migrants would adversely affect the wages of native workers for who
substitute. But, empirical analysis has shown that these effects tend to be rather modest,
if at all noteworthy. Nannestad states, “…there is very little evidence to support the
conclusion that immigration into western welfare states [U.S. included] has adversely
affected...income equality goals”(Nannestad P. , 2007).

He finds that natives lose 3

percent of wages as a result from a 10 percent wage by immigrants. Nevertheless, this
negative effect has shown to disappear over the course of four to seven years.
It may therefore be just as safe to assume that the much higher wages enjoyed by
legal immigrants over those low wages of illegal immigrants may render any wage
lowering effects inconsequential. Nannestad (2007) suggests that native workers at the
lowest skill levels (i.e., high school dropouts) only marginally feel wage-lowering effects
due to elasticity. These effects show to be weak as well.
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Moreover, there is no evidence that illegal immigrants are taking jobs from native
blacks, a minority with whom these immigrants would likely be competing against
(Espenshade, 1995). Intuition would suggest that the indiscernible wage effects are
realized because native laborers do not explicitly compete with migrant workers for
employment. A popular consensus is that migrant workers take the jobs that many
Americans are unwilling to compete for. This, however, may hold truth.

Effects on social protection
The discussion now turns to the impacts of migration on the American welfare
state. Conventional wisdom may lead to the assumption that effects on the American
welfare state are virtually non-existent in comparison to the migration effects on the
European welfare state. The United States has much less to offer by way of welfare (i.e.
transfer payments, healthcare, unemployment benefits), so one could posit that the net
effects of illegal/legal migration would only be a fraction of those effects felt by
European welfare states.

Nannestad (2007) supports this idea as he states, “…the

negative impacts of immigration are strongest in the most generous welfare states”. The
problem here is that these assumptions may be overly simplified. It is easy to make such
generalizations on broad scales, but it may prove beneficial put this idea under a regional
scope.
When looking at the United States as a whole, it may be easy to see that
immigration has not placed much burden upon the average citizen, but regional and local
effects may differ.

For example, a citizen from Texas or California, how may
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immigration affect them? Espenshade (1995) reports that the net effects on Texans are
lower than those on Californians. The reasoning behind this is that migrants into Texas
use public services much less in relation to their high tax payments, whereas Southern
Californian migrants use public services much more than they pay in taxes.

Age also

appears to be a variable. Younger migrants tend incur fewer costs than older ones
(Nannestad P. , 2007), “thus the fiscal net impact depends on which factor
dominates”(Nannestad P. , 2007). Consequently, the effects of immigration should be
considered as being dependent upon locale and demographics. On the whole, it appears
that immigration may have shown to have some beneficial properties. Although there are
some signs that migrant laborers mildly depress wages, they also help the rest of
Americans enjoy lower prices for restaurant meals, produce, and construction (Davidson,
2006), while allowing these industries to grow due to a more flexible labor force (Parker,
2005).

Policy implications for the United States
The direction in which U.S. policy should move is hard to characterize. In the
early 20th century, the Chinese Exclusion Act was written to stop Chinese migration into
the United States. It was soon realized that the motivation for foreigners to gain access to
the United States was greater than the governments resolve to stop the inflow of people.
Shortly thereafter, the Act was abolished.

A more prudent approach may involve

working with migrants who are already here. This idea was emphasized in 2005 when
President Bush outlined the idea for the guest-worker program; a policy that grants work
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permits to laborers already in the United States (Parker, 2005). A policy like this may
seem less daunting to those migrants who fear deportation. Not only would this program
encourage an increase in tax revenues, it would also motivate accountability. In other
words, the U.S. government may be able to gain a better approximation of who is in the
nation, which may very well lead to more accurate statistics on the effects of immigration
on the country’s economy. During the 1940’s President Roosevelt instated the Bracero
Program to import laborers from Mexico to feed the demand for manual labor in the
United States. It seemed to be somewhat successful as it lasted into the 1960’s, yet there
were increased costs because of the need to house, feed, and provide medical care the
Bracero’s.
Alternatively, policy-makers could find success in penalizing employers who
choose to employ illegal immigrants. It has been shown that immigrants who have
evaded U.S. Border Patrol and established residence face a probability of apprehension at
the rate of 1-2%(Espenshade, 1995). With the odds of detection being low, and the
reason for immigration based roughly on employment, it would only be seen as logical to
make the cost of illegal employment more expensive for both the employer and alien.
Employers would avoid hiring those who should not be rightfully employed, and aliens
would face a greater risk of detection. A policy as such may also provide the platform to
potentially reduce the depression of wages at the low skill level by acting as a deterrent
for “black-market” labor.

Although these types of policies may not lead to social

optimality in the labor market since the cost of total eradication of undocumented labor
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significantly outweighs its benefits, it may direct the economy to a more tolerant
concentration.

Immigration in the Scandinavian countries
Compared to the US, Europeans work less, take longer vacations, retire earlier,
and view job security and stability as a fundamental right. In the mixed economies of
Europe, society may determine much of an individual’s fortune and social equality.
However, it has been observed that Europe is facing a major decline in economic growth,
and its population is becoming older. The closed borders and strict immigration policies
promise to make the European aging populations amid low birth rates harder to sustain
(Alesina, 2006). On the other hand, not all European countries are doing worse than
before. Andersen(2008) states that the core principle of these successful Nordic models is
individual entitlement to public sector provisions, combined with collective financing via
taxes. They have managed to combine high income levels come together with a fairly
equal income distribution.
The Scandinavian countries distinguished themselves during the post-war period
by a particular kind of social and economic model. The small and peripheral countries
were late developers, initially industrialized on the basis of rich supplies of raw materials,
but early developers of more advanced, universal and ambitious welfare programs
(Benner, 2003). The countries are all characterized by high growth, a rapid introduction
of new technologies, while maintaining an advanced social protection and regulated labor
markets. Their employment and welfare model is based on tax-financed social services,
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generous social insurances, organized labor markets with limited wage and employment
flexibility, and a commitment to full employment. Even considering differences between
the Scandinavian countries, as a collective they appear to be successful in their adaptation
to the demands and restrictions of the global, knowledge-based economy, more than the
larger European countries (Benner, 2003). The Scandinavian welfare state thus appears to
be reliant on immigration that is high skilled and prepared to pay taxes.
The Scandinavian countries are also affected by globalization, and maintaining
the current levels of health care benefits, pensions, social benefits, education, and
unemployment will continue to be a challenge. The current lifetime income security will
be threatened. Benner (2003) argues that the development of Scandinavian countries
confirm the assertion that countries based on ‘social democratic corporatism’ succeed in a
globalized economy because they are able to implement wage-restraint programs, deliver
social stability even with volatile markets, and provide the economy with collective
goods. How does immigration fit into this picture?

Labor market effects in Scandinavian Countries
Today Western Europe welfare states find themselves in a paradoxical situation.
Parts of working life are in need of labor that is difficult to find. Coincidentally, migrants
seeking employment are often joined by family members (Brochmann, 2008). The
government is confronted with a mismatch between supply of and demand for
immigrants. The receiving countries do not get the labor they want, while many of those
who actually come cannot be incorporated productively. The social system is also
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affected by the New Residence Directive, which was adopted by the European Union in
2004. This directive makes it harder for European countries to decline or end the
residence of European citizens and awards a permanent right of residence after five years
in another country(Odom & Deis, 2007). As discussed before, immigration seems to be
an important factor that affects the social system. Scandinavian counties are experiencing
increasing immigration from developing countries. Roughly 55 percent of these
immigrants do not have training or experience, which makes them ill equipped for the
workforce (Segal, Elliott and Mayadas 2009). Because of this, the social system must
take responsibility for the training and education of these individuals in order for them to
become contributing members of the society (Odom & Deis, 2007). This is exactly the
way in which Scandinavian countries secure employment as discussed before. However,
it can be argued that these importing countries gain the advantages of adult labor without
paying the costs of raising children from birth, through entry into the labor force, which
in turn represents a significant allotment of social savings (Neal 1972). It is difficult for a
country to control the stream of immigrants, and policies directed towards those already
in the country even more so. For example the Danes implemented some control over
culturally sensitive areas such as prearranged marriages, but were accused of racism for
implementing controls in that area (Odom & Deis, 2007).
Nannestad (2007) describes the main conclusion of a working paper by Chand
and Paldam, where the economic effects of immigration into three types of host countries
are compared. Although the paper is based on assumptions rather than analytic research,
it gives us insight in the effects of immigration. The analysis shows that in a guest worker
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society of the ‘Dubai’ type immigrants can indeed be mutually beneficial for natives and
immigrants. The same may hold, but to a lesser degree, in welfare state such as the US. In
welfare states of the ‘Scandinavian’ type, immigrants gain from immigration, while
natives lose. Once an immigrant is accepted in a Scandinavian country, he is eligible for
social benefits just like a native citizen. The benefits are made to equalize incomes, so
they are highest at the lower end of the income scale where the immigrants are likely to
be for some time. This effect is confirmed by empirical research as described by
Nannestad (2007) where the net fiscal impact of immigrants has been found negative
since the 1990s for the Nordic welfare states.

Effects on social protection in Scandinavian Countries
In short, the Scandinavian model offers a comprehensive social welfare system
and labor market policies that ensure health care to all individuals, income equality and
very low unemployment (Odom & Deis, 2007). From the Roy-Borjas model one should
expect to find two trends in immigration from less developed countries into European
welfare states (Nannestad P. , 2007). Firstly, skill levels among these immigrants should
tend to be even lower than among immigrants into the US, because the dispersion of the
earnings distributions in Europe welfare states tends to be smaller than the US. Secondly,
European welfare states with the most generous welfare systems, like the Scandinavian
welfare states, should act as welfare magnets.
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Following the theory of the Roy-Borjas model, one should thus expect that an
immigrant would choose the country where it will receive most welfare benefits. Though,
immigration policy may offset the welfare magnet effect. Since 1973 most European
countries have had restrictive immigration policies, leaving open only two gateways for
legal entry: family reunification and the asylum system (Nannestad P. , 2007).
Immigrants that use the family reunification argument for legal entry are often
constrained in their choice of the destination country where their relative possesses
residence. Asylum seekers are not formally constrained, but even when they have a
personal preference for applying for asylum, they can be constrained due to logistics.
This is caused by a regulation that states one should apply for asylum in the first secure
country they arrive. Secondly, they might not use a welfare optimization argument
selecting a country, but they would rather choose to maximize their chance of being
admitted.
At first glance, the effects of immigration appear to be less negative in the US
than in Scandinavia, as predicted by a host of theories, and conforming to intuition.
Similarities include the fact that even if skilled immigrants may be preferred, the main
influx is of low-skilled workers. Policy implications, as far as the trend of increasingly
strict regulation towards immigration continues, will focus on addressing the immigrant
population already in the country. As an example, education is a positive force in the
process of integration, and more skilled immigrants may be net contributors instead of
benefiters of the welfare state.
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To attempt a short answer to the research question, it would be a yes, although
sources present variable evidence. Effects appear to differ. The extent of the welfare
state, with its reliance on high employment and collective financing seems to be the main
culprit of the adverse effect. Regulation of immigration is used to offset some negative
effects. Other possible routes to take in order to attract the relevant immigrant, is systems
based on points and merit, but this is highly contentious in the Scandinavian countries,
priding themselves on an egalitarian and humanitarian society.
In the case of the US, the issue of illegal immigration is particularly central,
shaping the debates, effects and policies. The problems with illegal immigration may
contribute in deterring natives from welcoming immigrants in the economy. However,
the picture looks a bit brighter on the other side of the Atlantic. The theory that
immigration depresses wages is obviously affected by the legal/illegal immigrant divide,
but does not hold on the whole, and in some areas there is even a positive effect. The
effect is seemingly not even present at a low level, and there is little evidence of
immigrants taking jobs from natives, as work preferences are fairly complementary.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the effects depend on geographical and
demographic factors, a natural aspect of studying such a large and diverse country. In
fact, this diversity itself represents an interesting discussion point. The sheer
homogeneity of the Scandinavian societies and labor markets may be a crucial factor in
the presence of the welfare state from the onset. This entails that immigration poses a
threat in the sense of diversifying society.
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3. Impact of Drug Policy on the United States and Portugal
“I'm in favor of legalizing drugs. According to my values system, if people want to kill
themselves, they have every right to do so. Most of the harm that comes from drugs is
because they are illegal.”
Milton Friedman
The burgeoning debate over drug policy in the United States has flourished in
recent years in response to the negative elements that have surfaced in an environment of
illicit drug prohibition. To some, prohibition has once again failed. To others, the value
of this rhetoric is on the rise in the “war” on drugs. One side of the argument feels that
this war on drugs is capable of being won. While others propose that prohibition is what
initiated this “war”. Today, U.S. drug policy is the model for Global drug policy, and
sadly so.

Portugal, however, has taken progressive and aggressive steps towards

dampening the problems that arise from drugs in prohibitory environment. Since 2001,
Portugal has taken a logical and economic approach to addressing their own drug
problems by decriminalizing all illicit drugs.

What must be noted is that

decriminalization has become increasingly more popular amongst citizens, and
politicians, in the country since its initiation, with the exception coming from the far-right
conservative politicians (Greenwald, 2009). Although it is understood that the policy
framework developed by the Portuguese is in need of fine-tuning to enhance efficiency, it
has by and large laid to rest the fears of those who tried to forecast a doomsday scenario
that “should” have resulted from decriminalization. This section takes advantage of the
empirical findings resulting from the decriminalization of illicit drugs in Portugal, and
will be used to create a template in which American drug policy should follow.
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Theoretical Background
This section argues for the decriminalization of illicit drugs in the United States. It
maintains that there are no market failures that could justify prohibition.

From an

economic standpoint, prohibition is a policy that saw little if any effectiveness with
alcohol earlier in the 20th century, and is overlaying idea in which many economists base
their opinion in favor of the decriminalization of illicit drugs. To further my opinion on
decriminalization I will discuss some of the troubles that stem from prohibition, namely;
crime (violent), cartelization, property crime, poisonings and overdoses, disease, and civil
liberty violation.

Violent Crime Precipitated by Prohibition and Cartelization
From past experience with the prohibition of alcohol, it is apparent that what may
be driving the high levels of crimes in the United States, and violent crimes in particular,
is the prohibition of drugs. The United States ranks first in the world in per capita
incarceration, with less than 5 percent of the world’s population, but almost 25 percent of
the world’s prisoners. In 1980, the number of prisoners in jail as a result of a drug
violation was 50,000, whereas today there are almost 500,000 prisoners, an increase of
almost 900 percent! (Nadelmann, 2007). There is a driving reason behind the evolving
crime rate in the United States. By prohibiting drugs, vast profits are left on the table as
business incentives for cartels and dealers. And, in a market where access to the legal and
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judicial system is denied because it is illegal, the marginal benefit to using violence to
resolve arguments increase greatly. Furthermore, the added cost to violent acts decreases
since certain “victims” of violent crimes will tend not to seek legal assistance when the
act occurred in the midst of an illicit transaction with drugs. With that, it is generally
believed that since suppliers tend to hide their operations from the law, it then becomes
easier for cartels to materialize.

And, since the marginal cost to imposing severe

punishment through use of violence tends to be lower, there is an added repeat interaction
between the cartel and those further down the chain, i.e. street level dealers and buyers.
(Miron & Zwiebel, 1995). Following this idea, those who are looking to enter the illicit
drug market and intend on going into direct competition with established cartels may face
violence themselves.

In markets over legal goods, the “cartels” would be facing lost

sales in the pricing battle with smaller companies. But, in these illegal markets, it is
those who use the most violence who tend to win. Examples of this can be seen
throughout South America and Mexico, where violence is a common occurrence and is
frequently attributed to interaction with cartels.

According to Tomas Kellner and

Francesco Pipitone, 6,587 murders occurred in Mexico in 2009 as a result of drug
activity, up from 5,207 in 2008, an increase of nearly 27 percent.
In addition to violence on the cartel level, violence at the street level will also rise
with prohibition. Local dealers and users will find that the marginal cost associated with
the use of violence attributed to illicit drug use/sales is lower than the benefit gained from
the money received from drug sales, or the high achieved through drug use. This theory
can be demonstrated by looking at the rising murder rates in the United States that had
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been seen throughout the prohibition. As noted by Miron and Zwiebel, murder rates rose,
both after the adoption of drug and alcohol prohibition laws in multiple states, as well as
during World War I and well into the 1920’s, where the prohibition was accepted on
national scale and was enforced increasingly (Miron & Zwiebel, 1995). It should also be
noted that these rates fell after the repeal of prohibition, yet they again rose in the late
1960’s and remained high until the 1980’s, which coincided with the crackdown on drugs
through law enforcement.

Innocent citizens may also feel the repercussions of

prohibition. In environments where violent crime due to illicit drug activity is rather
rampant, those not involved may arm themselves with firearms, etc. In this instance, it is
entirely plausible that there could be accidental discharge of the firearm injuring other
innocent people. In either case, this would mean that firearms would be more widely
available for both legal and illegal motives. Violent acts associated with drugs, more or
less, appear to tell the story that prohibition is accountable for a large portion of drug
related violence. (Goldstien, Brownstein, Ryan, & Belluci, 1989)

In New York City,

March to October 1989, there were 414 murders. Roughly half of those murders were
classified by authorities as drug related. Only 17 percent of those drug related murders
came from a state of mind influenced by a controlled substance. The other 83 percent
were of “economic compulsive,” or “systematic,” in nature. That is, someone was killed
in the buying or selling of illicit drugs (economic compulsive), or someone was killed
over drug territory (systematic) (Miron & Zwiebel, 1995).

Non-violent Crime
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Aside from the violent crimes that occur due to prohibition, there are other types
of crimes that can be associated with illicit drugs. These infractions are non-violent in
nature, but do add a considerable cost to society every year. Miron and Zwiebel (1995)
make reference to this idea, and maintain that theft and prostitution are two of the most
common crimes related to drug use. At first glance, one may come to the conclusion that
individuals take part in these acts because of the psycho-pharmacologic effects induced
by the drugs themselves, but it is more likely the case that these individuals are partaking
in these acts to support their drug use. The rates at which these crimes are committed are
likely intensified by the economic consequences that result from prohibition. It is likely
that prohibition will continue to raise the price of illicit drugs while raising the rate at
which these offenses are committed by users who cannot support their habit through a
normal income. This idea is supported by the work of Silverman and Spruill (1977) who
report that there is a positive correlation in increases in the price of heroin with these sort
of non-violent infractions of the law (Silverman & Spruill, 1977). It has also been well
documented that by increasing the amount law enforcement resources towards
implementing prohibition, these sorts of crimes associated with income creation rise
proportionally (Benson, Iljoong, Rasmussen, & Zuehlke, 1992). It is a well-accepted fact
that the United States is far from winning the “war on drugs.” What seems to fall upon
deaf ears is the fact that every time a group of border patrol officers seize a shipment of
illicit drugs, the price of that illicit drug increases, theoretically. Over time, this theory
becomes fact, and both violent and non-violent crimes start to increase again.
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Disease and Overdose
As prohibition persists, so does disease from drug abuse. Diseases that can stem from
drug use are a larger list than one might imagine.

HIV/AIDS is one of the most

recognized diseases contracted from drug abuse. But, what many fail to recognize is that
other diseases and afflictions can surface with relative frequency as well. Of those
diseases are: hepatitis, cardiovascular disease, stroke, cancer, and lung disease, to name a
few.

In a study done by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) in 2004,

researchers found that 45 percent of abusers without primary care suffered from chronic
illness, while 80 percent sustained previous hospitalization due to complications
associated with their drug use (De Alba, Samet, & Saitz, 2004).

There are some

countries, however, that are recognizing the need for harm-reducing policies or programs
such as needle-exchanges. Among these leaders in harm reduction are China, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and even Iran, where in 2005 the Ministry of Justice issued a fatwa declaring
methadone maintenance and syringe-exchange programs complementary to Islamic Law
(Nadelmann, 2007).

Although the availability of needles may not directly indicate

prohibition, proponents of the banning of illicit drug tend to support the restriction of
availability of needles. There is, however, data that indicates HIV infection rates are
much smaller in areas that provide greater accessibility to clean syringes (Gostin, 1991).
In addition to the many diseases that can be contracted through drug use in a
prohibited state, overdoses are likely to rise in an environment that fosters drug
manufacturing without regulation or quality standards. This would be the case because it
would be impossible for a buyer to object to the quality of a product without implicating
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themselves. Although their process may be mildly flawed, Miron and Zwiebel have
displayed this idea with their research that showed deaths due to alcoholism rose during
alcohol prohibition (Miron & Zwiebel, Alcohol Consumption During Prohibition, May).
Without the worry of regulation, manufacturers and distributors will only slightly rely on
reputation for repeat service to buyers/users. For this reason, overdoses and poisonings
emanating from illicit drugs of sub-par quality will likely continue to rise in a prohibition
state.

Data Research
In my search to find a correlation between substance prohibition and the increase
in crime, it was quickly understood that finding data to substantiate this claim is quite a
surmountable task. The problem lies within finding a proxy for, in the preferable case,
alcohol during the prohibition. Alcohol was prohibited by the 18th Amendment on
January the 16th, 1919. It was put into effect the very next day. Since the use of alcohol
was banned, statistics on consumption became very difficult to quantify. There are,
however, a few tools that may be used to gain some insight into the usage of alcohol
during the period of prohibition. Drunkenness arrests are an agent that can be
quantifiable through legal records, and was used by Angela Dills (Dills, Jacobson, &
Miron, 2005) in her paper on the effect of the Prohibition on alcohol consumption. Her
findings are rather interesting. According to her data, Dills finds that Prohibition plays an
important role during its inception, but in the long term it has nearly zero effect on
drunkenness arrests. Her data is preferable to cirrhosis data because data from deaths
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occurring from cirrhosis are subject to a lag effect. Furthermore, the liver is capable of
recuperating when there is low, or no alcohol consumption, creating a decrease in deaths
due to the disease. Her data reveals that in the years covered by Prohibition, cities that
were covered in her sample displayed a fall in drunkenness arrests of a mere 10-30%
(Dills, Jacobson, & Miron, 2005). Dills and Miron’s data on cirrhosis deaths showed a
decrease of 10-20%. (Dills & Miron, 2004) In my opinion, the conclusion that the drop
in deaths due too cirrhosis, which was of a smaller magnitude than the decrease in
drunkenness arrests, is more intriguing than the results stemming from the arrests data
alone. Intuition would commonly suggest that deaths due to cirrhosis should fall at a
much higher rate due to the nature of the disease. The fact that the death rate didn’t fall
at a higher rate leads me to some speculative conclusions. We’ve already maintained that
prohibition decreases the supply of illicit substances, and with this assumption and our
knowledge of the nature of cirrhosis, one might come to the conclusion that the
percentage change in the amount of deaths due to cirrhosis would be rather large.
Intuition should suggest that with even a modest drop in consumption due to prohibition,
there should be an even larger drop in cirrhosis deaths. This is because with less access
to alcohol, there are some users who may walk away from the substance, or at least find
trouble accessing it for longer periods of time. Under this assumption, it should be safe
to suggest that there would be a greater decrease in deaths due to cirrhosis merely
because of the liver’s ability to recuperate after periods of little or no alcohol. While this
may be implausible, I feel that there is an even simpler reason for why the death rate due
to cirrhosis did not fall as much. My contention is that alcohol was likely manufactured
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to contain a higher percentage of ethanol, the “drug” that gives alcohol its psychoactive
characteristics. And the reason that alcohol likely was stronger is simple; a bottle of
whiskey is much easier to conceal than a case of beer. Bootlegging spirits is also a much
less complicated operation to conceal, and would produce more alcohol on par with
greater efficiency, than would, say, underground brewery or winery. There is fact behind
this conjecture. “Moonshiner’s” or “bootlegger’s” became prevalent throughout the
United States during the time of the prohibition, and who were known for their high-test
alcohol. On occasion, there was a possibility of accidental poisoning from methanol
intake, a dangerous and toxic byproduct that market alcohol can potentially contain in a
black market with no regulation.
I chose to look at the correlation between murder rates and alcohol consumption.
There is a popular theory that when substances are restricted homicide rates tend to spike.
Although we do not have data for alcohol consumption during the years of the
prohibition, we can still tease interpretations out of simple regressions of the two
included variables. But first, I will cover the data that I’ve compiled in Figure 3.
In 1919, the U.S. Senate passed the Volstead Act, otherwise known as the
National Prohibition Act. It is clear in the data that at the time of the passing of the
Volstead act, homicide rates were already following a steady rise. The reason there
wasn’t an abrupt spike is for the known fact that states across the country were already
passing legislation prohibiting the sale and consumption of alcohol. By looking at the
graph, this can be clearly seen as murder rates are rising in response to the development
of a new black market. Once Prohibition is put into full effect across the country in 1919,
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there is a rather significant spike in the murder rate, which rises from 6.8 in 1920, to 8.1
homicides per 100,000 in 1921. During Prohibition, you can see that homicide rates
peaked at 9.7 murders per 100,000. In 1933, President Roosevelt signs the CullenHarrison Act that nullifies the Volstead Act, and legalizes the manufacture, sale, and
distribution of alcohol in the U.S. From there, there is a remarkable fall in the murder
rate that reaches a base of 4.5 homicides per 100,000 in 1945. There is short 5-year
period of increased homicide rates between the two valleys of 1945 and 1951 that I find
hard to interpret. The timing of this peculiarity coincides with the ending of WWII, but I
can only interpret this as being an anomaly because murder rates remain consistently low
for the next few years until they begin to rise again in 1957. From then on, the path
follows a steep rise until 1975. I interpret this as the population’s reaction to the
Narcotics Control Act of 1956, which was put in place to allot penalties with intensified
severity for illicit drug violations by increasing the maximum and minimum years to be
served, as well as imposing a hike on fines. What I found interesting in the data is that
not only do the amount of homicides increase as restrictions magnify, which runs
concurrent with my theory, alcohol consumption also rises and stays high until 1985.
What this tells me is that there is a substitution effect that takes place when access to one
item becomes inherently more difficult than access to a substitute. It is not to say that
heroin is a fair substitute for alcohol, but there are those recreational users of drugs that
are, for lack of a better definition, “less dangerous,” and may find alcohol to be a fair
substitute. Although they may not be perfect substitutes, the substitutability is great
enough to show a modest increase in alcohol consumed when penalties associated with
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illicit drugs are increased. It should also be mentioned that the Narcotics Control Act was
not a solitary action taken by the government to curb the use, importation, and
manufacturing of illicit drugs, there was also the Drug Abuse Control Amendments of
1965, enacted to suppress the distribution of psychoactive, hallucinogenic, depressant,
and stimulant drugs. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse and (Prevention) Control Act of
1970 was instated to hold the pharmaceutical industry accountable for the security and
record keeping of specific manufactured narcotics. Further restrictive acts are the
Methadone Control Act (1973), the Heroin Trafficking Act, and the creation of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1973. From 1969 all the way up until the mid1990’s, the homicide rate stayed above 8 homicides per 100,000, the first time over the
last 100 years, and the only time since the Prohibition era. Furthermore, from 1970-1975,
some states began raise the legal age of alcohol consumption to 21 years. This data seems
to add value to my argument. That is, massive amounts of profits are left on the table that
are nearly free to those who wish to start there own criminal enterprise, and who also feel
that the marginal benefit to using violence outweighs the marginal cost of the penalties
received from being caught.
The next piece of data that deserves attention appears on the consumption line in
1984. Consumption takes a hit because of the National Minimum Drinking Age Act,
which would require the drinking age to be increased from 18 to 21. What is equally
interesting is that consumption rises quickly back to pre-1984 levels. This would appear
to substantiate Miron’s data that claims alcohol consumption during the prohibition
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would nearly reach pre-prohibition levels (Miron & Zwiebel, Alcohol Consumption
During Prohibition, May).

Data Analysis
To test the hypothesis that policies restricting illicit substances can lead to a
higher murder rate, I have compiled a data set containing relevant data from the years
1910-2007. Data on homicide rates for these time periods was available at the Bureau of
Justice statistics, and it provides a per year count of homicides per 100,000 people.
Unemployment rates were retrieved from Historical Statistics of the United States, and
were added to see if they had any added effect to murder rates. Dummy variables for all
policies, which would have had restricted supply of illicit substances further, were added
into the regression to account for any interaction that could potentially occur from more
restrictive illicit substance policy. The empirical specifications estimated are put in the
following

Results
Table 1 takes the initial step in regression analysis by presenting log regressions
of the homicide rate on year (year), unemployment rates (u), a lagged homicide rate
variable ( hrt −1 ), and dummy variables created for the 18th Amendment (proh), state level
prohibition (stproh), Narcotic Control Act (nca), Heroine Trafficking Act (heroine), Drug

€Abuse Control Act (ada), and the National Minimum Drinking Age Act (nmda), along
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with a constant ( α ) and error term ( σ ). The empirical specifications estimated are
denoted in a predictive regression of the form:
€

€
hrt = α + β0 hrt −1 + β1 year + β2 u + β3 proh + β4 stproh
+β5 nca + β6 heroine + β7 ada + β8 nmda + σ t

€ 2 is the same regression as the first only in log form shown in the
Table
following equation:

log hrt = α + β0 hrt −1 + β1 year + β2 u + β3 proh + β4 stproh
+β5 nca + β6 heroine + β7 ada + β8 nmda + σ t

€ of both tables provide mixed evidence on whether policy meant to restrict the
The results
supply of illicit substances increases the murder rate. The data shows that the effect of
restriction through policy is only significant with the Narcotic Control Act. The
unemployment rates are also shown to have no statistical significance. The 18th
Amendment was only marginally significant.
In order to detect the presence of autocorrelation between values that are
separated from each other with a time lag, the Praise-Winsten was employed in the
regression analysis (Table 3). The Prais-Winsten regression should give a more precise
estimate of the variables by developing a bounds test for the null hypothesis that the error
terms are not auto-correlated. For a regression with 96 observations, the bounds would
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be set between 1.44 and 1.9. The Durbin-Watson statistic has an initial value of 1.6,
which falls into the region of indecision. In Prais-Winsten regression the coefficient
remains significant, but increases to .7 for the Narcotic Control Act (nca) variable, which
implies a roughly 10 percent increase in the murder rate.

Interpretation
These results are not supportive of the hypothesis that policies that restrict the
supply of illicit-substances that would have a positive effect on the murder rate. The
results suggest a few things. It tells us that the Narcotics Control Act of 1956 had the
biggest effect on the murder rate. Since this policy has shown some effect on estimation,
adding time lags to the policy variables may increase their significance, as oftentimes
there is a lag between when a policy is enacted, and when it starts to show results.

Further Research
It’s not until 1993 that the homicide rate plunges and reaches a new table. No
substantial changes in policy had taken place since the late 1980’s, so there is much left
to be explained. After doing much research, I chose to take a rather non-traditional look
at the data by soliciting information from a source of illicit drug distribution in the 1980’s
and 1990’s. His name is “Freeway” Ricky Ross. Ross was a drug trafficker during the
1980’s and 1990’s, and he recently did an interview with National Public Radio. He had
talked on some topics that most researchers would neglect to incorporate into their
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analysis. It’s not for lack of intellect that these researchers overlook these ideas; it’s
simply for the fact that they have never seen the inner workings of a drug enterprise.
Admittedly, Ricky Ross does not originate from an academic background, but his insight
forces additional context to the topic, and because of that I feel his voice deserves some
consideration.
Now, most economists would argue that prices for outlawed goods rise because of
a risk premium. Ross’s contends that this is not necessarily true. He insists that many of
the dealers and distributers that he dealt with did not demand these risk premiums, and
his reason was that life was hard in the neighborhood he grew up in, and whether or not
an individual pushed drugs, most did not expect to live past their 20’s. This state of mind
may not be confined to Los Angeles where Ross conducted his business. In fact, I would
contend that the 20-plus-year period where the murder rates stayed above 8 murders per
100,000 might have added to this train of thought amongst those in the drug trade
throughout the country, and could have potentially driven prices down slightly. Miron
has found that drugs such as heroin and cocaine are substantially more expensive than
they would be in a legal market, but are considerably cheaper than analysis would
suggest (Miron J. A., The Effect of Drug Prohibition on Drug Prices: Evidence from the
Markets for Cocaine and Heroin, 2003). It would take research beyond the scope of this
paper, but it is not out of the realm of possibility that the acceptance of the reality of
doing business in a black market may potentially be a contributing factor in the lower
than expected prices of illicit drugs, and ultimately, a decline in the murder rate.
However, there are limitations to this theory. Lower prices, albeit higher than legal
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prices, in such a dysfunctional environment may create even greater competition amongst
those directly and indirectly involved in the drug cartel hierarchy. Increased competition,
paired with a continued positive marginal benefit to violence, may create an environment
of even more violence. This, however, is not what is reflected in the data. I am fully
aware that the mindsets of inner city drug dealers, and the potential corresponding effects
on drug prices, could not completely capture the fall in homicide rates in the 1990’s to
today, but I believe it is possible that it may account for a small portion. Levitt offers a
list of potential reason why the murder rate declined abruptly in the beginning of the
1990’s. His contention is that demand for crack cocaine decreased greatly from its high
demand past, and can explain 15 percent of the decrease in crime during the decade
(Levitt, 2004). It should also be noted that Cork used city-level data to find that sharp
increases in crack-cocaine arrests transpire concurrently with equally stark surges
juvenile gun homicides (Cork, 1995). Further analysis of latent proxies must be
compulsory.
Portugal’s Drug Decriminalization
On July 1, 2001, Portugal established a rather dramatic policy on drugs that may
set the new standard for drug policy across the globe. Portugal did not shift towards
more draconian principles, like that of some Asian and Muslim nations that put offenders
away for prodigious sums of time, or even executes them. Nor did they spend millions
upon millions of Euros attempting to shut down manufacturers and distributors of drugs
in the same fashion as the United States. Alternatively, the government boldly chose a
policy framework focused on decriminalization of all drugs. By decriminalization, the
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Portuguese government is vocalizing that the possession, purchase, and the utilization of
any and all drugs is no longer considered to be a criminal offense, or a matter for the
criminal justice system. This means that only noncriminal sanctions will be appropriated,
and will be treated solely as an administrative offense. When necessary, appropriations
are in the form of light fines, or if the “offender” becomes habitual, there is a possibility
for treatment requirements. In Article 2(1) of the statute, the basic framework is laid for
the policy as it states:
“The consumption, acquisition, and possession for one’s own consumption
of plants, substances or preparations listed in the tables referred to in the
preceding article constitute an administrative offence.” (Portuguese
Legislation in English, 2010)
The table that is referenced circumscribes narcotics and psychotropic substances that
were formerly criminalized. It is important to point out that they also comment on one’s
own consumption, which is to be interpreted as an amount “not exceeding the quantity
required for an average individual consumption during a period of 10 days.” This is
important because trafficking still remains criminalized. While it obviously does not ban
drugs, it certainly limits its availability. But this fact does not inhibit the effectiveness of
the policy, as we shall see shortly.
Where someone is “caught” offending, penalties are limited to small fines, or
alternatively, to non-monetary citations. There is also a scale to which penalties may be
issued. First time offenders may be issued a warning, whereas repeat offenders may face
a range of penalties from a oral warning to a small fine of usually 25 Euros. When the
Dissuasion Commissions come across a repeat offender who shows signs of addiction,
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they may suspend any penalties under the condition that the offender pursues treatment.
The Commissions also have the ability to suspend proceedings of fines for other nonaddicted offenders contingent on the circumstance that there is no subsequent offence
under an allotted period of time. Further, minors who are cited for infraction face the
same process, but are provided legal council to work on their behalf. Distributing drugs
to minors, however, is still classified as a criminal offence, and can carry a prison
sentence between 4 and 12 years.
By decriminalizing all drugs across the board, and treating instances as
administrative offences, the stigma that is carried with drug use begins to dissolve.
Hughes and Stevens (2009) describe police work as a supplement to the countries goal of
reducing drug use in a fashion that fosters the reduction of ignominy that has been carried
by users during drug prohibition:
“The law enforcement sector was seen as supportive of the reform,
particularly because they perceived decriminalization and referral to
education and treatment as offering a better response to drug users than
under the previous legislative approach. Key information asserted law
enforcement have embraced the more preventative role for drug users.”
(Hughes & Stevens, 2007)
Greenwald (2009) goes into this in more detail by explaining that Dissuasion
Commissions go out of their way to take any convictions of guilt out of drug usage,
emphasize health and treatment, and proceed through the process in an air of equivalence
where Commission members dress informally and sit at the same level as the alleged
offenders.
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What the Portuguese are doing by way of policy appears to be working.
Although, before 2001, and leading up to the decision to enact said policies, some
members of the Popular party were concerned that drug usage would escalate and
introduce drug tourism into the country. However, none of this happened.
Approximately 95 percent of those cited for offences are of Portuguese residence
(Greenwald, 2009). In the end, however, Greenwald (2009) notes that these officials
adopted decriminalization on the grounds that it would reduce drug related problems, and
would not be introduced as a “concession to the inevitability of drug use,” but rather as
an effect governmental tool to curtail addiction and associated evils of illicit drugs.

Effects of Decriminalization in Portugal
Since the inception of decriminalization in 2001, Portugal has not run rampant
with addicts and dealers as some speculated, rather, the country itself has become
somewhat healthier due to it. Greenwald (2009) documents this outcome with data
thoroughly in his paper. As you can see in Figure 4, prevalence of drug use in middleschool child dropped in every category accounted for over the five-year period between
2001 and 2006. Equally impressive is the fact that drug use amongst cohorts stays below
2001 levels until you reach the 20-24 year old age range where usage increases by a
modest 5 percent (Greenwald, 2009). I think the increase in this particular cohort can be
best described as a “coming out party.” Essentially, this group was in the critical age
bracket whose members were likely to already have had some experience, and began
pushing the cohort effect onto others within their age range. I would gather that policy
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has begun to take away the seductiveness of drug use, and those who will eventually will
be the next to enter the 20-24 year old bracket will likely have a lower lifetime
prevalence to drug use simply for the fact that this measure was lower for them in their
middle school years than it was for the 20-24 year olds during their middle school years.
Now that we have covered the reduction of prevalence rates, we will continue by
addressing effects on health. Figure 5 shows that drug related deaths have decreased
overall, most notably in the opiate category. Greenwald (2009) notes that the amount of
toxicological exams has increased every year since 2002, but positive tests for drug
related deaths decreased significantly for every prohibited substance. On the surface this
would appear to tell the story that individuals are taking part in the treatment programs.
As it turns out, many addicts are taking advantage of the programs that are now being
offered to them. The Portuguese government reported that the amount of people in
treatment suggested by the Commissions skyrocketed from 6,040 in 1999, to 14,877 in
2003. This resulted in an increase of 147 percent of those pursuing treatment, and can be
directly attributed to policy change. Furthermore, Greenwald’s (2009) research shows
that most EU states have drug usage rates on the order of three to four times than that of
Portugal after the 2001 policy change. It is likely because funding, and the willingness of
individuals to partake in offered treatment programs, has greatly increased.
It would appear that Portugal has taken a calculated risk, and has seen great
success. The results run opposite of countries with stringent criminalization regimes that
see high rates of crime, drug related death, and high usage rates. The most important
aspect of this type of policy is that it gives constituents freedom from fear of prosecution,
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and encouragement in the direction of treatment and better health. It is safe to say that
the swing in resource allocation from prosecution to treatment has been quite effective.

Policy Implications for the United States
Any economist will tell you that it is impossible to take what one has done in
country A, and apply that idea to country B, and then expect to have identical results.
History has shown that the world is not a sterile laboratory for economic testing. But, I
feel that the underlying fundamentals concerning drug policy remain fairly consistent
across the board. Essentially, all participants in the black market for drugs are following
the same ideas. Dealers and distributors want the overwhelming profit left on the table
by criminalization, and users want the high they get from illicit drugs. I am of the
personal opinion that no amount of money can be thrown at the problem. Intentions of
both dealers and users need to be addressed. Taking away profits eradicates the dealers,
while dissolving the stigma related to drug use brings addicts piece of mind, allowing
them to seek help when they likely would not under a prohibition regime. It is projected
that by decriminalizing illicit drugs the United States could face a $76.8 billion a year
into the U.S. economy. $44.1 billion through savings on law enforcement, and at least
$32.7 billion in tax revenues from regulated sales (Debusmann 2008). This number, I
believe, would eventually decrease because, as seen in Portugal, the amount of users
decreased greatly, which in turn would reduce revenues from taxation of drugs.
For the United States to be successful in this endeavor, there are a few issues that
would need to be addressed. First, I believe there is need for a greater effort to be put
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into education of juvenile on the inherent dangers of drug use. Studies have shown that
high school students and younger are very susceptible to drug use via there peers. So, it
would be wise to take this into consideration. Strict laws forbidding the sale and
distribution to minors should be put into place and carry heavy fines with an equally
taxing prison sentence. Obviously, as our history has shown, these acts will still occur
but will potentially transpire at a discounted rate. Furthermore, Portugal has seen success
with this type of reform directed towards underage use, and has seen rather dramatic
success.
Secondly, access to rehabilitation should be paid for through revenues received
from drug taxation. Again, this is an idea that has already been put in place by the
Portuguese, but within it hides the fundamental reason why this element works. It is
because users are no longer looked at as criminals, but as people who are in need of help
just as much as someone struggling with any other type of psychological disease. Once
addicts feel comfortable seeking treatment without fear of prosecution, there will be a
positive flow into facilities of those searching for help.
Third, offer clean needle exchanges. Gostin (1991) has shown that countries with
facilities that offer this kind of service have lower rates of HIV/AIDS infections.
Fourth, give repeat offenders the opportunity to attend treatment programs. An
addendum to the Portuguese policy that I would suggest is to have outreach program that
pursue addicts. This would further the thought that addicts are no longer criminals, but a
part of society that need help, and are cared for by their community. Freedom from
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addiction should be celebrated and seen as a community conquest in the pursuit of a
healthier population.
Finally, one thing that Portugal did not add to their policy is a legal contribution
of harvests to drug distribution centers from independent growers/manufacturers. This
would further take away profits from cartels via an increase in competition. These new
“manufacturers” would also have to be closely monitored/regulated so that smaller black
markets do not arise. Overall, I think the policy put in place by Portugal is a very good
model, and should be mimicked by the U.S. as closely as possible.
There are, however, limitations to this argument. With decreased price, and
greater access to drugs, there is potential for increases in addiction. Although this is not
what was observed in Portugal, it is one of the factors that could remain unknown until
the policy is actually enacted. I would say that this would not be a long run trend, as
there would also be greater access to sufficient treatment and rehabilitation.
Another limitation that could potentially arise is the continuation of black markets
for drugs that are easy and cheap to manufacture/harvest. Marijuana fits the bill for both
of those criteria. All that is needed is fertile land to grow it on, and agreeable weather.
Crystal Meth is also very cheap to make, and highly addictive. For this reason I not
foresee this drug on the shelves of depositories. But without a doubt, there would still be
demand for. I feel these limitations would decrease in intensity over time legal drugs
would find price equilibrium, naturally eliminating those markets.
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Conclusion
Both immigration policy and drug prohibition have an implied similarity. By
restricting something that a cohort is after, you will likely incur exorbitant costs when
trying to enforce policies that are meant to hinder access to those wants. To be
successful in managing these situations, it is critical that those who will be enacting said
policies completely understand that there will be trade-offs involved. By loosening
immigration laws, while tightening the noose on employers to keep workers legal, there
is an innate that risk there could be a massive inflow of immigrants into the country. As
immigrants are also contributing members to the economy, legalizing there ability to
work could in turn generate income tax revenue. Furthermore, by giving them legal
wages, they will sequentially have greater purchasing power in which to reintroduce
money into the economy. The other side of that coin lies in overpopulation, potential for
increased crime, and degradation of resources.
The current administration in the United States that encourages the prosecution of
all participants of the drug market, are likely doing more harm than good. Excess profits
are available to those (cartels) who wish to participate in these markets, and retention of
control of those markets is kept through violence and intimidation. Nonviolent crimes
stem from the need to finance addictions, along with a lack of alternatives to the
continued use of drugs. Health of the population is also degraded as shared risks of
infectious diseases are spread through circles of drug users, which can eventually
spillover to the general population. Overdose due to the lack of regulation is always a
fear, as the quality of substances can take a back seat to the distributors need for profit.

45

By decriminalizing drugs, citizens are freed from the burgeoning fear that arises
from prohibition and enforced prosecution. The stigma attached to drug use will be
forgotten, and users will be treated as patient and equals, rather than inmates and
criminals. Both violent and nonviolent crimes decrease because of the lowered price of
drugs, finally creating a higher marginal cost than marginal benefit. Finally, the health of
the population could potentially be upgraded from pre-prohibition levels due to greater
access to healthcare and treatment, and better drug education.
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Figure 1 Self Selection of Immigrant Flow (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg 2009)

Figure 2 Immigrant Flows When Income Falls (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg 2009)
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Figure 3 Immigration Possibilities for United States, Mexico, Sweden, and Africa.
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Figure 3: Homicide Rates and Alcohol Consumption in the United States (1910-2007)
Source: Crime in the United States, 2008, FBI, Uniform Crime Reports
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. reg hr

L.hr year u proh stproh

Source

SS

nca heroine ada nmda

df

MS

Model
Residual

278.971351
19.4952551

9
87

30.9968167
.224083393

Total

298.466606

96

3.10902714

hr

Coef.

hr
L1.
year
u
proh
stproh
nca
heroine
ada
nmda
_cons

.9384032
-.0063228
.0010651
.3845749
.241
.5840007
-.0270518
.1451741
-.174721
12.45612

Std. Err.

.0443884
.0099557
.0157116
.237748
.3583139
.241602
.3078053
.3668853
.3716018
19.45281

Number of obs
F( 9,
87)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

t

P>|t|

21.14
-0.64
0.07
1.62
0.67
2.42
-0.09
0.40
-0.47
0.64

0.000
0.527
0.946
0.109
0.503
0.018
0.930
0.693
0.639
0.524

=
=
=
=
=
=

97
138.33
0.0000
0.9347
0.9279
.47337

[95% Conf. Interval]

.8501765
-.0261109
-.0301634
-.087975
-.4711877
.1037907
-.6388481
-.5840502
-.9133198
-26.20845

1.02663
.0134652
.0322936
.8571248
.9531876
1.064211
.5847445
.8743984
.5638778
51.12068

Table 1: Results from regression on homicide rates with lagged homicide rate, year,
unemployment, and policy variables.
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. reg lhr

L.lhr

Source

year u proh stproh
SS

df

nca heroine ada nmda
MS

Model
Residual

6.13577365
.436844144

9
87

.681752628
.005021197

Total

6.5726178

96

.068464769

lhr

Coef.

lhr
L1.
year
u
proh
stproh
nca
heroine
ada
nmda
_cons

.9281097
-.0012849
.0008213
.0535576
.0375524
.0991805
.0026497
.0206931
-.0198702
2.587291

Std. Err.

.0431351
.0014809
.0023178
.035673
.0531502
.0360011
.0448626
.054886
.0554421
2.904034

Number of obs
F( 9,
87)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

t

P>|t|

21.52
-0.87
0.35
1.50
0.71
2.75
0.06
0.38
-0.36
0.89

0.000
0.388
0.724
0.137
0.482
0.007
0.953
0.707
0.721
0.375

=
=
=
=
=
=

97
135.77
0.0000
0.9335
0.9267
.07086

[95% Conf. Interval]

.8423739
-.0042283
-.0037857
-.0173464
-.0680894
.0276244
-.0865197
-.0883987
-.1300674
-3.184792

1.013845
.0016585
.0054282
.1244617
.1431941
.1707366
.091819
.1297849
.090327
8.359374

Table 2: Results from regression on homicide rates with lagged homicide rate, year,
unemployment, and policy variables.
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Prais-Winsten AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

147.925445
18.6985598

9
87

16.4361605
.214925974

Total

166.624005

96

1.73566671

hr

Coef.

hr
L1.
year
u
proh
stproh
nca
heroine
ada
nmda
_cons

.8728355
-.0156937
.0111251
.2722402
-.1072628
.7012239
.3098371
.237703
-.165131
31.04732

rho

.2631031

Std. Err.

.053067
.0116009
.0186096
.2903004
.4238981
.2938716
.3595227
.4015531
.4071707
22.65241

t

16.45
-1.35
0.60
0.94
-0.25
2.39
0.86
0.59
-0.41
1.37

Number of obs
F( 9,
87)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

P>|t|

0.000
0.180
0.552
0.351
0.801
0.019
0.391
0.555
0.686
0.174

=
=
=
=
=
=

97
76.47
0.0000
0.8878
0.8762
.4636

[95% Conf. Interval]

.767359
-.0387518
-.0258635
-.3047633
-.9498061
.1171222
-.4047531
-.5604274
-.9744268
-13.9768

.978312
.0073644
.0481136
.8492437
.7352805
1.285326
1.024427
1.035833
.6441648
76.07143

Durbin-Watson statistic (original)
1.650520
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.026590

Table 3 Results from Prais-Winsten regression with Durbin-Watson test statistic
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Figure 4: Prevalence of Illicit Substances in Middle School Age Children (Greenwald,
2009)
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Figure 5: Deaths, by Year, by Substance, Portugal (Greenwald, 2009)
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